In a carbon constrained world, why increase the rate of carbon production?

Since the realization that carbon deposits in the atmosphere could cause global temperatures to rise, there has been increasing conversations on humanity’s role in causing this rise in temperature. We call this the Anthropocene Era, or the span of time in which the activity of humans has and continues to fundamentally alter the state of the world. (For the sake of this conversation, we’re going to assume that the anthropogenic climate change is incontrovertible.) The potential outcomes from this have ranged from mild warming of the global climate to the end of life on earth as we know it. I would wager that there is a fat tail of predictions that map the most disastrous outcomes. Many of these predict existential events.

Warning, normative statement: If there is a significant probability any one of these predictions coming true, humanity should coordinate to prevent this from happening.

One possible solution is by removing the human factor entirely. If there are no humans, there can be no anthropogenic climate change. This is also an existential event; therefore, I will ignore the potentiality of this being doable. I should note that many movements that proclaim a retrogression to primitive human civilizations are equivalent to the removal of humanity. How? No one ever states how far back we must go to not affect the world. Even going back a few centuries of economic evolution requires the elimination of billions of lives. Who decides who gets to live? How this is any better than allowing for future climate catastrophes to take their toll on humanity. This moral implications of this philosophy make it unacceptable.

Solution number two involves in doing nothing, or perhaps increasing our carbon production, which would end in any number of mild to existential level events.

Solution three involves using the resourcefulness of humanity to produce outcomes which are less severe than those being predicted. Even if the probabilities are currently set. moving one percentage point towards a more positive outcome is worth it. Should we do whatever is necessary to avoid the worse outcomes? I can’t answer that. What we shouldn’t do is make things worse. Specifically, if we’re looking to reduce carbon production, using fossil fuels in place of gaps in renewables or nuclear power is anathema to this goal.

Data to come later.

The Efficacy of Groups, Group Selection, and an Ecology of Plans

Richard Wagner posits that the macroeconomy is made up of an ecology of plans; I am sympathetic to his views because this allows for a framework of the economy to be seen as more than just the sum of its parts. This is because macroeconomic action is not just an aggregate of microeconomic action. The exception to this is at the very first encounters where the macro level interactions have yet to be formed (there are no institutions, formal or informal, that dictate behavior). After these are established, the micro transactions rely on the macro economy to enable them while the macro economy can only be perpetuated by the continuance of micro-level human action. One cannot exist without the other once the cycle has been initiated. Though, it is very possible that either one of these may wane in presence of the other.

The mediator between micro and macro action is that of the meso-level. Agents form themselves into groups; in fact, many agents will self-select or be selected into several groups. Families are one such type of these groups, while political parties, friendships, civic organizations, and religious congregations are all examples of groups in which any one agent can simultaneously take part. In both the public and private sphere, what causes these groups to survive throughout more than just one generation? What about an even smaller time scale, like more than a few meetings? What about Black Swan groups like the Bolsheviks? What are the behavioral mechanisms that ensure their continued survival? How does this compare to those who do not propagate for more than one life cycle?

I do believe that in the case of many of these sets, there exists a form of group selection similar to that in the evo-bio literature. Groups evolve a specific set of geno/phenotypic traits that occur at the group level instead of at the individual level. There is some argument in the evo-bio literature, but given that social systems can exhibit increasing returns to scale because of institutions or technology, I intend to sidestep their disagreements until another time. This means that a social system (a collection of groups into a very large group) is able to evolve certain traits that are different from those of another social system. I’ve argued in short essays that these traits may be readily copied by another group because knowledge is non-excludable and nonrival in nature. It has been pointed out to me that this means very little because it depends not on transference of knowledge but on the use of knowledge. I can’t agree more given that most people today have access to the entirety of human knowledge via a device in their pockets, but instead of using it for the advancement of our species, many play video games or feed a dopamine addiction. (This is pot calling the kettle black; I guilty of both of these.)

What I propose is an extension of Dr. Wagner’s hypothesis: the ecology of plans matters at the meso-level as well. Groups have plans. They are a way to lower the transaction costs of many people into a singular goal. Some of these groups seek domination of an entire economic system, others simply want to enjoy the fellowship of their members. I think I’ve mentioned Ostrom’s rules on common pool resources; these extend to efficacy of groups. In future posts, I hope to work out some agent based modelling of this.

Sidebar for myself: Demand will eventually create a supply through a variety of mechanisms and processes that necessitate the actions of entrepreneurial agents, but the converse is not true.