Ostrom, CPRs, and the Efficacy of Groups

Elinor Ostrom’s work in her study of common pool resources is paramount to my ideas. Ostrom defined the conditions in the form of eight core design principles:

1. Clearly defined boundaries
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs
3. Collective choice arrangements
4. Monitoring
5. Graduated sanctions
6. Fast and fair conflict resolution
7. Local autonomy
8. Appropriate relations with other tiers of rule-making authority

These design principles are what is necessary for group survival and success to take place. Ostrom also defines success, for institutions: institutions are successful when they enable agents within the system to engage in productive outcomes despite the ever-present temptations of shirking and free-riding. I think this focus on “productive outcomes” could lay the basis of future system effectiveness/ efficiency, but that still leaves and immense amount of gray area to be resolved.

Using the CPR framework, the Soviet Union was destined to fail because its scores on conditions 2, 3, 6,7, and 8 were subpar. I would further claim that the USSR was doomed to failure (by productive outcomes) because it failed to meet certain criteria applied to socio-ecological systems. Namely, it failed to create a coherent system that allowed for interaction in a resilient and sustained manner. Furthermore, it failed to allow for a dynamic economy that allowed for continuous adaptation. Central planning and mono-centricity are anathema to adaptivity at the micro and meso levels.

[1] Wilson, Ostrom, and Cox. “Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 90S (2013) S21–S32. 2012.

[2] Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons. Cambridge, 2018.

Author: Deric Tilson

I am a classically-trained economist and doctoral student at George Mason. I'm an ecopragmatist and interested in the cross-section where economics, ecology, and ethology meet. I hope to work for non-for-profits specializing in economic development and eventually moving to either the public sector or a think tank. My research interests include the political economy of war, resource economics, the applications of complexity theory, the mitigation of risk by impoverished individuals, and global water scarcity. View all posts by Deric Tilson